Elsevier

Health Policy

Volume 119, Issue 11, November 2015, Pages 1506-1514
Health Policy

An evaluation of the Public Health Responsibility Deal: Informants’ experiences and views of the development, implementation and achievements of a pledge-based, public–private partnership to improve population health in England

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.08.013Get rights and content

Highlights

  • Business partners participated in the Responsibility Deal for reputational reasons.

  • Partners frequently chose pledges reflecting work they were already doing.

  • The Responsibility Deal is likely to have limited ‘added value’.

  • Government needs to set out a clear vision for the RD.

  • These findings have implications for the development of other voluntary agreements.

Abstract

Objectives

The Coalition Government's Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD) was launched in England in 2011 as a public–private partnership designed to improve public health in the areas of food, alcohol, health at work and physical activity. As part of a larger evaluation, we explored informants’ experiences and views about the RD's development, implementation and achievements.

Methods

We conducted 44 semi-structured interviews with 50 interviewees, purposively sampled from: RD partners (businesses, public sector and non-governmental organisations); individuals with formal roles in implementing the RD; and non-partners and former partners. Data were analysed thematically: NVivo (10) software was employed to manage the data.

Results

Key motivations underpinning participation were corporate social responsibility and reputational enhancement. Being a partner often involved making pledges related to work already underway or planned before joining the RD, suggesting limited ‘added value’ from the RD, although some pledge achievements (e.g., food reformulation) were described. Benefits included access to government, while drawbacks included resource implications and the risk of an ‘uneven playing field’ between partners and non-partners.

Conclusions

To ensure that voluntary agreements like the RD produce gains to public health that would not otherwise have occurred, government needs to: increase participation and compliance through incentives and sanctions, including those affecting organisational reputation; create greater visibility of voluntary agreements; and increase scrutiny and monitoring of partners’ pledge activities.

Introduction

Public–private partnerships (PPPs), which involve co-operative agreements between corporate and public sectors [1], are increasingly employed in addressing health challenges [2], [3]. The Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD) was launched by the then Coalition Government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in England in 2011 as a voluntary, pledge-based, public–private partnership between government, business, the public sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to improve public health in the areas of food, alcohol, health at work and physical activity. Andrew Lansley, then Secretary of State for Health, asserted that, ‘By working in partnership, public health, commercial and voluntary organisations can agree practical actions to secure more progress, more quickly, with less cost than legislation’ [4]. The RD is overseen by a Plenary Group, and consists of four networks: Food (F), Alcohol (A), Health at Work (HAW) and Physical Activity (PA). A fifth network focusing on Behaviour Change was reconfigured in 2013, and its work incorporated into the remaining four networks. Each network has Steering and Working groups consisting of representatives of participating sectors, and has developed collective pledges (e.g., ‘We will do more to create a positive environment that supports and enables people to increase their consumption of fruit and vegetables’)[5] (see https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/ [5] for full list). Partners are required to sign to at least one collective pledge from any of the networks, and to produce delivery plans describing how they will implement their pledges as well as annual progress reports. DH places these on the RD website [5].

The public health effectiveness of PPPs, voluntary agreements and industry self-regulation has been questioned, particularly when they involve the food and alcohol industries [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. Lessons learned from the tobacco arena suggest that voluntary agreements may initially appear helpful, but can ultimately serve to stall government action on public health [11]. However, the benefits of PPPs have also been elucidated [1]. Bryden et al. [12] concluded, based on a review of the evidence, that voluntary agreements can potentially be an ‘effective policy approach for governments to take to persuade businesses to take actions’, but only where components such as ambitious, clearly defined targets, sanctions for non-compliance, disincentives for non-participation and strong monitoring systems are in place.

This paper reports the findings of a qualitative analysis of interviews with RD partner organisations, those with a formal role in implementing the RD, and interested non-partners or former partners about their experiences and views of the development, implementation and achievements of the RD overall. This analysis forms part of a wider evaluation of the RD's processes and likely impact on the health of the English population.

Section snippets

Methods

Conceptually grounded in a logic model designed to describe how the RD might work and should be evaluated [13], the research questions driving the analysis in the current paper are: why, and in what ways, do organisations engage with, and experience, the RD; how is the RD perceived to be evolving; and what are its main achievements, strengths and weaknesses?

We purposively sampled interviewees from three groups with experience and/or knowledge of the RD: (1) RD partner organisations; (2) DH

Findings

Key themes and sub-themes presented here are outlined in Table 3.

Discussion

Our findings suggest that the impact of PPPs like the RD as public health initiatives may be limited if they continue to be developed and implemented as the RD has been to date.

Business partners’ reported motivations for participating in the RD include enhancing CSR and reputation, ‘doing the right thing’, and the wish to stave off regulation, while reputational management also appears to be a key consideration in terms of partners’ pledge choices, implementation and reporting activities. This

Conclusions

If the objectives of the RD or similar future initiatives are to be realised, this analysis suggests that there is a need for greater consideration of how potential reputational gains and losses, along with more formal incentives and sanctions, can be used to encourage participation and the implementation of pledges that go beyond ‘business as usual’. Furthermore, greater consideration needs to be given to how RD-like PPPs might be strengthened in terms of pledge construction and reporting,

Author contributions

MAD conceived, designed and planned this part of the wider evaluation. MP, EE, CK, and NM were also involved in the design. MAD and LG undertook the fieldwork. MAD, LG & MP conducted the analysis. All of the authors contributed to manuscript revisions.

The evaluation of the Public Health Responsibility Deal is part of the programme of the Policy Innovation Research Unit (http://www.piru.ac.uk/). This is an independent research unit based at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine,

Competing interests

None declared.

Ethical approval

Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (Approval number: 6373—April 2013).

Acknowledgements

We would like to express our gratitude to those organisations and individuals who participated in the interviews. We also wish to thank Lorelei Jones, Joanna Reynolds and Nicolas Douglas who assisted with the data coding.

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